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ABSTRACT
Poverty, property rights and distributional implications of community-based resource management
have become major topics of discussion and debate in recent years. This study tries to examine the
contribution of community forestry to household-level income with particular emphasis on group
heterogeneity and equity in benefit distribution.  The assessment of household level benefits suggests
that poorer households are currently benefiting less in absolute terms from community forestry than
less poor households.  In terms of  the contribution of forests to household income, the study results
suggest that the poor are not necessarily more dependent than the rich, a finding that contradicts results
from other similar studies. Econometric analysis suggests that income from community forests is related
to socio-economic attributes and private resource endowments of households.  Households with land
and livestock assets, as well as upper caste households gain more from the commons, while better
educated households depend less on forest resources. Female-headed households benefit less from
community forests, further aggravating the inequity in distribution of benefits. The study makes a
number of recommendations to improve community forest management in Nepal, which include, due
consideration for community needs in selecting species for community forestry, transferability of user
rights, which would allow less endowed households to benefit more, and more and equitable
representation of women and disadvantaged groups in forest management committees (JEL Q2, Q23).
Key words: property rights, common property resources, heterogeneity, community forestry, forest
user groups, equity, distribution, forest income.
Sandee Working Paper No. 1-032
Sandee Working Paper No. 1-03 3
Property Rights and Natural Resources:
Socio-Economic Heterogeneity and Distributional Implications of
Common Property Resource Management
BHIM ADHIKARI
1. Introduction
Community management of local natural resources has become an integral part of sustainable
development policy in the last few years.  There is now considerable evidence that centralised
management is unable to provide the right incentives for sustainable resource use. Thus, it is increasingly
argued that organised civil society can play an important role in overcoming many economic problems
related to internalisation of externalities,  provision of local public goods, and access to credit by the
poor — problems that neither the market nor the state can reliably solve (Molians, 1998).  Recognising
the importance of organised civil society, many developing country governments have begun to support
community-based resource management.  In Nepal and other south Asian countries, this attempt has
focused on poverty alleviation, local level economic development and forest conservation.
Participatory resource management is viewed as a solution to a number of problems linked to state
management of natural resources such as information asymmetries, incentive incompatibility, lack of
effective monitoring and maintenance etc.  However, results emerging from experiments in community
management suggest that there may be a number of distributional problems associated with structured
attempts to manage common pool resources (CPRs) (Kumar, 2002).  Mixed results have been observed
on the potential of CPR systems to have a positive impact on the livelihood of the very poor and
marginalized sections of communities (Campbell et al., 2001; Beck and Nesmith, 2001).  Thus, the
success of CPR management appears to be dependent on the existence of a well-specified rights structure
and the congruence of this regime with its ecological and social context (Hanna and Munasinghe,
1995).
The CPR literature argues that poor people extract more resources from the commons due to greater
reliance on natural resources and also due to their high individual rate of time preference. If poverty
increases the marginal rate of time preference to very high levels, then future environmental effects of
current resource use are optimally ignored. High rates of time preference and shorter time horizons
may also prevent poor people from investing in environmental conservation. Consequently, the poor
disregard the need for conservation of resources and adopt strategies that yield more immediate results
(Holden et al., 1998). Some scholars posit that compared to the non-poor, the poor may depend more
on the commons in relative terms but in absolute terms their dependency is lower (Dasgupta, 1993).
While the poor may attempt to minimize risk by using forest resources to mitigate shortfalls in
consumption levels, the rich or the less poor may be interested in enhancing their earnings by selling
these resources, particularly, when there are good market opportunities.
Though there have been a number of theoretical and empirical studies on the successes or failures of
collective action, relatively few have paid attention to equity and distributional implications of common
property institutions. Existing empirical studies have focussed mainly on communities as opposed to
households in describing the success of CPR management. It is assumed that communities will
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collectively manage local resources because of the substantive benefits to be derived from these resources.
Moreover, when the responsibility of allocating natural resources is delegated to local organizations,
communities are expected to distribute these resources more or less equitably among the members.
However, there is now some evidence that formalized systems of community property rights may lead
to a gradual but systematic exclusion of poorer households from CPRs (Beck and Nesmith, 2001).
This paper examines this broad concern by investigating whether recent policy shifts towards community-
based forest resource management in Nepal have increased access of poorer households to community
forest (CF) resources.   The working hypotheses of the paper are:  1) the poor are, in absolute terms less
dependent, but, in relative terms more dependent, than the ‘less poor’ on forest resources; 2) there are
differential impacts of CF management and the poor benefits less than ‘less poor,’ and 3) ability to use
the CF resources is directly linked to heterogeneity in the private resource endowments of households.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section two reviews some theoretical and empirical work
on inequality and distributional aspects of CPR management. In addition to a description of the problems
associated with CF management in Nepal, section three  discusses the property rights structure over
forest resources. Section four discusses methodological issues and survey design. Section five reports
the results obtained from economic and econometric analysis. The final section concludes with policy
recommendations.
2. Poverty, heterogeneity and Common Property Resource use
Research on CPR management has become increasingly concerned with the contested role of group
heterogeneity in determining the success of institutions (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Bardhan and Dayton-
Johnson, 2000; Bardhan, 1993; McKean, 1992; Kanbur, 1992; Keohane and Ostrom, 1995; Wade,
1994; Velded, 2000; Dayton-Johnson, 2000; Varughese and Ostrom, 2001; Karaivanov, 2001; Adhikari,
2001). The term heterogeneity is used to describe asymmetric distributions of wealth and power, different
preferences and opportunity costs, unequal claims to natural resources, and caste and ethnic divisions
within a community. Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2000), for example, consider both economic and
social inequalities that may bear upon the success of collective action.  In their work heterogeneity
includes inequalities in income among the members of the group, inequalities in the sacrifices made by
community members in cooperating with CPR management, inequalities in benefits derived from CPR
management, inequalities in outside earning opportunities, cultural heterogeneity, and, locational
differences that might influence an individual’s incentive to cooperate. As Kant (2000) proposes,
heterogeneity with regard to CPR management is at three different levels. First, economic, socio-
cultural, and other social differences form a basic level of heterogeneity.  Due to this basic heterogeneity,
members of the user group may have diverse preferences for timber and non-timber forest products and
hence prefer to harvest  different mixtures of products. Further, preference over diversified forest products
often leads to different preferences for resource management regimes. The preference for different
resource management regimes forms the  third-level heterogeneity.
While there is consensus that heterogeneity is a factor in community-based resource management,
there are no clear answers as to how and to what extent heterogeneity contributes to or diminishes the
likelihood of successful CPR management. Several decades ago, Olson (1965), hypothesized that
heterogeneity may enhance the likelihood of collective action as economic agents with larger
endowments and power may bear a larger portion of costs associated with cooperative action. By
bearing a larger proportion of costs, this group can better internalize the positive externalities generated
from the management of public goods. Baland and Platteau (1997) reinforce the theoretical possibility
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of Olson’s hypothesis especially when management of CPRs involves important “non-convexities” in
its production function. Nevertheless, Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2000) note a U-shape relationship
between inequality and commons management. Very high and very low levels of inequality are associated
with better commons performance while mid-range levels of inequality are associated with poor
outcomes.
Heterogeneity can have discernible negative effects on CPR management in two different ways. First,
socio-economic inequalities within communities are reflected in the form of heterogeneous preferences
for forest resources; consequently, management objectives become more diverse and challenging to
effectively implement (Kant, 2000). Second, a high degree of heterogeneity can provide opportunities
for powerful minorities to impose management rules that serve their own interests (Eder, 1987;
Guggenheim and Spears, 1991). Individuals with higher power influence the ‘operational rules’ that
affect day-to-day operational modes of forest user groups, which in turn affects individual or group
incentives for collective action. Thus, socio-economic differentiation can decrease the likelihood of
successful collective action because of disincentives that result from divergence of interest among
heterogeneous economic agents.
Consistent with the growing theoretical literature, there is a large amount of empirical research, especially
in India, dealing with poverty, inequality and the dependence of rural households on CPRs (Jodha,
1985, 1986, 1990, 1995; Iyengar, 1989; Beck, 1994, 1998; Singh et al., 1996; Iyengar and Shukla,
1999). Beck and Nesmith (2001) note that CPRs currently contribute some USD 5 billion a year to the
income of poor rural households in India, or about 12% to the household income of poorer households.
Jodha’s (1986, 1995) study from 80 villages in 21 districts in India concludes that CPRs contribute 15-
25% of the total income of poorer households.
Studies from different states of India have found that CPRs contribute 1.1 per cent to 29 per cent of the
income of poorer households.  The average contribution at the state level are 0.1 to 22 per cent, 10 per
cent, 22 to 27 per cent and 19 to 29 per cent in Gujarat, Karnataka, Punjab and West Bengal respectively
(see Iyengar and Shukla, 1999; Pasa, 1992; Beck, 1994; Singh et al., 1996; Beck and Nesmith, 2001 for
details). These figures for non-poor/cultivating households are 0.1 to 11.4 per cent, 6.2 per cent, 22 per
cent and 0.13 to 5.62 per cent. In a study of 29 villages in Southeastern Zimbabwe, Cavendish (1998,
1999) arrived at even larger estimates. He observed that the proportion of income based directly on the
commons is about 35 per cent. Moreover, the figure for the poorest quintile is 40 per cent. Based on a
qualitative assessment of babassu products in Maranho, Brazil, Hetch et al., (1988) also conclude that
the products offer support to the poorest of the poor, especially women. There appears to be a general
consensus that poorer household are dependent more on CPRs and consequently derive higher income
from these resources.
On the other hand, there is evidence that the wealth endowment of households affects private benefits
from commons since productive wealth creates opportunities for better-off households to use biomass
resources. While wealth directly affects the ability to appropriate resources from commons, the social
reputation of wealthy individuals indirectly provides opportunities to access CPRs through leadership
and influence on public decision-making processes. There are several examples of this positive
correlation between private wealth and use of public resources.  For instance, Singh et al., (1996)
observe that the use and exploitation of CPRs in Punjab was directly proportional to the ownership of
private resources.  McKean (1992) in a study on a heterogeneous village society in Japan concludes
that distribution of benefits of collective action reflects inequalities in private wealth. Chopra et al.,
(1990) found that endowments of cultivable land, cattle and particular machines or harvesting tools
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determine a household’s ability to use CFs and grazing lands in India. In a study of CF management in
Nepal, Richards et al., (1999) observe that household members with bigger land holdings benefit
proportionally more from CF than members with smaller holdings.
In recent years, some studies have shown that formalisation, commodification and privatisation of
CPRs in heterogeneous communities may marginalize weaker sections of society.  Thus, these studies
posit that poor households who enjoyed certain benefits from CPRs under traditional systems of resource
management may actually lose out when the system is formalized. For example, Bokil (1996) observed
that the individualization of common land has benefited the economically privileged sections of the
society and in the process the poor has been deprived of resource appropriation and benefit sharing. In
the first systematic study of CPRs in West Bengal, Beck and Ghosh (2000) have found that poor people
are being systematically excluded from customary access to CPRs due to agricultural intensification,
commodification and formalisation of property rights, population pressure and environmental
degradation. Hill and Shields (1998) observed that community incentives in joint forest management
(JFM) in India are not so clear-cut and the main losers in JFM are fuel-wood head-loaders who are
often form the poorest subgroup within the village. Moreover, it is the richer members of the community
who tend to dominate local politics and organizations in India.  Thus, benefits from local institutions
such as JFM accrue mainly to richer sectors of the community (Saxena, 1989).
While local level CPR management appears to enhance efficiency of resource use by making the overall
cake bigger, it is not clear that all local households gain from this increase in natural assets. Thus, in
some scenarios, it may be more appropriate to gauge CPR management success not only by reference
to its efficiency, but also by the sustainability of resource use and its success in promoting equitable
distribution of benefits (Adger and Luttrell, 2000). Though the management of CPRs and the implications
for environment and poverty has been well studied in India, no systematic effort has yet been undertaken
in Nepal.  Moreover, despite some cost-benefit analyses of CF management, little attention has been
paid to the differential nature of returns to different interest groups within resource-using communities.
This study seeks to bridge this gap in understanding about how and to what extent the poor are dependent
on community forests in Nepal.
3. Property rights and forest resources in Nepal: An overview
Property rights structures over forest resources have frequently changed in Nepal. Under the Forest
Nationalisation Act of 1957, a very controversial step in the history of forest management in Nepal,
huge tracts of forest previously managed as private and common property were brought under state
control. Though there is still a huge debate on forest nationalisation and the deforestation hypothesis in
Nepal (Ives and Messerli, 1989; Fisher, 1990), many scholars believe that local communities throughout
the country reacted negatively to forest nationalisation believing that their traditional rights of access
and use had been curtailed (Bromley and Chapagain, 1984; Bromley, 1991). As a consequence, this act
increased the rate of deforestation as villagers hurried to convert affected lands into agricultural use so
as to exempt them from the transfer (Bromley, 1991). In response the government introduced another
act, the Forest Act of 1961, which was more focussed on forest administration.  This Act, which further
consolidated the notion of forest nationalisation, was amended in 1978 to include different forest
management regimes such as Panchayat Forests (a local level political unit), Panchayat Protected Forests,
Private Forests, Leased Forests, and Religious Forests.
Sandee Working Paper No. 1-03 7
By the mid 1970s, it was clear that local people had to be involved in every aspect of forest management.
As a result the new and far-sighted Community Forestry Legislation and Decentralization Act was
passed in 1982. The Forestry Master Plan (HMGN/MPFS, 1988) spells out a comprehensive policy
statement for CF management, and emphasizes that control of forest should be turned over to forest
user groups (FUGs).
After democracy was restored in 1990, the government framed the Forest Act of 1993, which focussed
on sustainable management of forest resources under community-based property rights regimes. The
Forest Act vested more legal authority in FUGs. This legislation was given greater coherence by the
1995 Forest Rules, which clarified the powers and duties of FUGs. As per these policies, local
communities are organised as FUGs and accept the responsibility for protection, management and
sustainable utilization of forest areas under community-based property rights regimes. To date, more
than 11,000 FUGs manage about 848,159 hectares of community forest in Nepal (HMGN/CPFD, 2001).
Based on a conceptual schema proposed by Schlanger and Ostrom (1992), the following collective
rights can be described in the context of CF management in Nepal.
1) Operation-level property rights
Access rights
· All defined users have a right to enter into community forestry as per specified rules and an
agreed-upon operational plan, i.e., block, time, months, season, etc.
Withdrawal rights
· All users are entitled to harvest pre-defined types and  units of forest products from CF.
2) Regulation rights: Regulation rights consist of the following:
Management rights
· Decisions regarding operational rules on forest protection, harvesting, utilization and
sanctioning for rule infractions are made by FUGs.
· FUGs can plant long-term cash crops like medicinal herbs and other non-timber forest
products (NTFPs) without disturbing the main forestry species (collectively owned) and
they can establish forest-based industries.
· Users can amend the Operational Plan by simply informing the forestry authority and they
can fix the price of the forest products irrespective of the government royalty and they can
use surplus funds for community development work.
Exclusion rights
· Users themselves identify the traditional users of CF and they reserve the right to form
FUGs and Committees through consensus within the community. They define who are the
included users and who are excluded persons. FUG can provide membership to new entrants
(migrating households) under certain conditions.
Alienation rights
· There is no mechanism by which user group members can sell or lease his/her share of
rights to other users of the same group. Products from CF can only be used for subsistence
needs; not for commercial purpose. Users are not allowed to sell their private share of the
produce in the market.
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Despite being one of the most innovative policies in place to promote community-based resource
management, some authors have noted that CF may not have helped needy people, but rather may have
often worked to their disadvantage (Garner, 1997). In his study on the effectiveness of CF management
in Nepal, Adhikari (1996) argues that distributional aspects of the CF program in the middle hills of
Nepal is dictated by the socio-economic conditions of resource users. Although improvement in the
physical stocks of  trees and other resources on both public and private lands have been evident (Branney
et al., 1994), equitable use of forest products such as fuel-wood, fodder, timber and other non-timber
forest products within the community has not been clearly demonstrated (Malla, 2000). The landless,
and households belonging to particular ethnic groups such as the blacksmiths, and other politically and
economically marginalized people are not able to take advantage of incentives for tree growing. Many
scholars argue that the restriction posed on the collection of various non-timber products after the
institutional change actually hurt poorer households whose livelihoods were traditionally closely linked
to the collection of these forest products (Springate-Baginski et al., 1999; Richards et al., 1999; Adhikari,
2002a).
4. Study sites, methods, and data collection
4.1 Data collection
This study was undertaken in two selected districts of the mid-hills of Nepal where CF interventions
have been implemented for the last two decades. In order to address the research hypothesis posed in
section one, four FUGs (Saradadevi, Jyala Chiti, Mahavedsthan and Thuli Ban) in Kavre Palanchok
districts and four FUGs (Gaurati, Shree Chhap, Janghare and Karki Tar) in Sindhu Palanchowk district
were selected.
The middle hill region occupies the great central belt of Nepal where the country’s origins and character
are mostly rooted. This area comprises approximately 30 percent of the whole area of the country
(HMGN/MPFS, 1988). The land-uses of the Middle Mountains are categorized as cultivated land,
non-cultivated inclusions, grasslands, forestland, shrub lands and other types of land uses.  Based on
Dobremez, (1976), Jackson (1994) identifies 8 different forest types in the middle-hills using altitude
as the main criterion. However, only three different forest types, i.e., coniferous forest (dominated
species Pinus roxburghii), broad-leaved forest (dominated species Schima wallichii and Castanopsis
indica) and broad leaved and coniferous mixed forest, were observed in the study sites. Caste and
ethnic diversity is a characteristic of the middle hills with a significant number of people belonging to
such ethnic groups as Brahmins, Chhetris, Newars, Tamangs, Thakalis, Magars, Gurungs, Rais and
Limbus. Most of the population in this area are subsistence farmers with few options for other livelihood
opportunities. All accessible hill forests in the study area are surrounded by agricultural land and are
under heavy pressure to meet the primary forest product needs of the households. Livestock, an integral
part of the subsistence farming system, is a source of protein (milk and meat) and draft power.
A stratified sample of households was chosen by compiling a census of village households with
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques. Participants in the PRA exercise were asked to categorize
all households into three different stakeholder groups, poor, middle wealth and richer households,
based on criteria that villagers consider as important for assessing an individual’s socio-economic
position in the village. Fox (1983) and Richards et al., (1999) have used similar criteria for categorizing
households into different income groups. The main criteria used for the categorization were the extent
of land owned, loans given and taken, and income from off-farm agricultural activities.  In addition,
land quality and household food sufficiency were also considered. Poor households own 0 to 0.25
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hectare of land, with a mean of 0.15 hectare. Middle-wealth households own between 0.28 hectare to
0.75 hectare with a mean of 0.51 hectare. Richer households own between 0.78 to 4.25 hectare, with a
mean of 1.33 hectare. This categorization should be understood in relative terms since all households
in the study area are subsistence farmers with few households having earning opportunities outside
agriculture and CPRs.
Primary data on household level variables, and the use and management of CF was collected through a
survey of 330 households. The sample represents 20 per cent of households from each group in eight
villages. The Survey was conducted for a period of 4 months from September to December 2000.
Questions were asked to obtain information on four general areas: 1) demographic information; 2) land
holding, tenure and off-farm production systems; 3) CPR management and utilization; and 4) household
awareness/participation in CF management. The main fieldwork was supplemented by two short visits:
September-October 2001 (by two research assistants) and February 2002 (PI with research assistants)
to clarify various concerns raised during the main survey. Twenty one out of 330 questionnaires were
discarded from the final analysis since they were incomplete. Since these are all subsistence farm
households, they adequately represent a typical forest-dependent rural household in the mid hills of
Nepal.
4.2  Household benefits from CF
Household benefits from community forests were assessed by valuing the goods collected and harvested
from forests.  The economic values of  different forest products such as firewood, tree fodder, cut grass,
leaf litter, medicinal herbs and plants, timber and some other direct and tangible benefits by user
households were estimated. Despite the fact that there are many potential forest products, only firewood,
tree and grass fodder, and leaf litter significantly contribute to the household economy. In all study
sites, about 5 respondents (i.e., Ayurvedic Doctors or  traditional healers) reported that they collected
some medicinal herbs from community forests. Though the high-altitude forest of Kavre Palanchowk
and Sindhu Palanchowk districts contain a variety of NTFPs (mainly medicinal plants), none of these
products seem to contribute to either household or forest user group income. The following procedure
was adopted to value the household-level income from CF.
a. Calculation of gross value (income) of forest products: Gross income is calculated by multiplying
the quantity of forest product harvested by the price of the product minus cash costs like hired labor
costs, direct cash payment to FUG as monthly membership fee, etc.  Since the amount of forest
products collected varies with the seasons (due to climate changes, user group regulations, and
seasonal agriculture work),  information was collected for 12 consecutive months. In all the sites
considered, green fuel-wood harvesting was a restricted activity that could only be harvested once
or twice a year for a fixed period of time. Fuel wood and other forest products cannot be harvested
for commercial purpose.
The market price, barter method and opportunity cost approach were used in valuing forest products.
Firewood consumed at home or exchanged with kin was valued at retail purchasing price in the
village or forest-gate price (Gunatilake, 1998). Non-marketed NTFPs and tree and grass fodder
were valued by the barter game method (Godoy et al., 1993, Richards et al., 1999). In order to
perform the barter game method, the participants of discussion groups were divided into two groups,
i.e., buyers and sellers, with buyers purchasing tree or grass fodder in exchange for a local commodity
which has a well-known market value (Richards et al., 1999). In this exercise, buyers were given a
bag of rice and the sellers were given a bundle of fixed unit (bhari or head load) of tree and grass
fodder. The participants were asked to discuss within their group the quantity of rice they deserved
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in exchange for forest products. Finally, they actually exchanged the products for a fixed quantity
of rice after a consensus was formed between all members within the group.  The value of tree and
grass fodder was derived from this exercise since the market value of rice is well established. Leaf
litter was valued based on the labour cost of time spent in collecting and transporting a bhari of leaf
litter from CF. This cost information was obtained during group discussion with key informants.
Since village wage rates vary with season, the average wage rate throughout the year was used.
Differences in wage rates between villages were also considered since wage rates were not identical
for all study sites. Care was taken to avoid unrealistic estimation because the accuracy of recall
information drops when people are asked to remember events in the distant past (Bernard et al.,
1984).
b. Calculation of net income: Forest net income refers to revenues less cash and imputed costs of
labor as well as the cost of tools and equipment and their depreciation costs (Wollenberg and
Nawir, 1999). So the costs here include labor costs of time directly associated with finding, extracting,
processing and transporting forest goods from the forest to the village, the cost of tools and equipment
(including depreciation) and the transaction costs incurred by households. During the field survey,
respondents were asked to report on ownership of tools used in forestry operations, their costs and
economic life, and the percentage used on forestry and non-forestry activities. Based on this, total
costs of tools and equipment used in forestry operation were derived (see Richards et al., 1999 for
similar methodology). The net income from forest products was, thus, calculated as gross income
(‘a’ above) minus imputed costs, including transaction costs incurred by households.
Three broad types of transaction costs were considered—costs of decision-making (TCD), costs to
implement those decisions (TCI), and costs of monitoring (TCM) the implemented decisions. The
TCD refers to costs incurred during the process of acquiring information about forest and community,
and the costs of co-ordinating the activities such as identification of potential users, preparation of
forest management plan, and negotiating with the forest department. These costs are mainly the
time spent for community meetings, conflict resolution, and so on. TCI includes costs incurred in
carrying out obligatory activities such as thinning, pruning, fire protection, and forest road repair
and maintenance, etc., in order to comply with management decisions. TCM refers to those costs
incurred for monitoring and enforcement of agreed-upon rules, record-keeping, and minute book
maintenance, financial monitoring of FUG, and other monitoring-related activities. Transaction
costs, therefore, were simply measured in terms of labour opportunity costs of time spent in these
community activities. Transaction costs for CF management as a percentage of total costs were
higher for poorer households (14%) than those for middle-wealth (12%) or rich households (9%)
(see Adhikari, 2002b for detail).
4.3 Forest use and socio-economic heterogeneity
An econometric model was developed to understand the relationship between forest dependency
(household level income from CF or value of outputs) and socio-economic determinants (Yanggen and
Reardon, 2001). Outputs refer to various forest products such as firewood, tree fodder, grass fodder,
timber, leaf litter and other non-timber products that households collect from community forests. As
discussed earlier, it was hypothesized that household-level benefits from common property forests
would be inextricably associated with household and community attributes. So variation in forest
dependency among households can be explained by the socio-economic status of user-household. This
relationship can be represented as:
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The corresponding regression equation  (2) is defined as a log-linear model and is based on a similar
model by Di Falco and Perrings (2002) used to understand the effect of cooperative production on
intra-specific crop genetic diversity.  The dependent variable, Yi, measures household-level return from
CF (gross value of outputs).   The independent variables, Xij, refer to household and the community
attributes.
(2)
The quantity of different forest product harvested is an alternative method to measure forest dependency.
However, it is not possible to aggregate different quantities of forest products into a single measure.
Therefore, the gross value of output is preferred. In addition to equation 2, the link between socio-
economic variables and specific important forest products is explored by estimating three more
regressions. Equations 3a to 3c analyse the relationship between the gross value of tree and grass
fodder, leaf litter, and fuel wood respectively, and socio-economic and community attributes. Table 1















































































While most of the variables in Table 1 are self-explanatory, some clarification is required on the dummy
variables used.  Distance to the market appears as village dummy 1 and 2, which are the nearest and
furthest villages from the nearest market.  TCOST refers to technology employed in harvesting.  As
discussed, the sample was divided into three income groups based on the wealth level of households.
Thus, income status is represented by the dummy variables INCOMPOOR and INCOMRICH.
Ethnicity or occupational caste may affect the preferences of the household and thus influence labour
allocation and consumption decisions. It may also be that occupational caste households have different
access to local environmental resources than higher caste households (Cooke, 2000).  Power dynamics
in communities are related to caste and this has implications for resource use.  Beteille (1983) points
out that in Indian villages access to local common-property resources is often restricted to the privileged
(for example, Brahmin and Rajput) caste groups. The outcasts or scheduled castes are often among the
poorest of the poor and are frequently deprived of entitlement to these resources due to social exclusion
and marginalization. In such a setting, lower caste households of the community may not have equal
access to the village commons as the households belonging to upper castes. Therefore, it is assumed
that lower caste households derive lower income from CF compared to the higher caste households.
It is argued that higher education in the rural community leads to extraction of fewer forest resources
since education opens up better employment opportunity and diverts people from subsistence agriculture
and gathering activities (see Gunatilake, 1998).  In this respect, it is assumed that education may be
negatively related to household-level benefits from community forests. Allocation of household labour
among different activities may change over the life-cycle of the head of the household (Godoy et al.,
1998). To assess the extent to which forest labour allocation changes over time and its relationship with
household level income from CF, the age of household head (AGE) was incorporated in the model. The
higher levels of income from CPRs are expected to be associated with the younger age of the household
head because older age reduces the probability of collection and thereby income as older people have
less mobility (Kohlin and Parks, 2001). On the hand, the age of household head is also related to the
household’s experience in managing common resources as well as accumulation of social capital.
Older people have better experience in local resources than younger ones and this may enhance the
quantity of harvesting from CF. So the effect of age of household head on income is indeterminate.
In common literature, gender is often used to test the effect of gender difference on the level of cooperation
in CPR management (Grossman, 1996). Some experimental studies on gender and cooperative behaviour
indicate that women contribute more than men to managing commons due to  greater interdependent
utility and altruism (Folbre, 1994). However, in this study, one of the aims was to see whether access to
and income from CPR is significantly different between male-headed and female-headed households.
This is of particular importance in rural Nepal, where male members often enjoy greater freedom,
income earning opportunities and control of resources. It is, therefore, hypothesised that male-headed
households derive more income from community forestry than female-headed households.
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Table 1. Explanatory variables and hypotheses
Variables Expected sign Description
Caste (CASTEL) - Lower caste dummy (if so called untouchable caste
=1, 0=otherwise)
Caste (CASTEH) + Higher caste (If Brahmin =1, 0=otherwise)
Education (EDU) - Average education of family members (number of
school years)
Age of household head (AGE) ? Age of household head
Gender (GEND) + Sex of respondents (If male = 1, 0=otherwise)
Landholding (LANDHO) + Land area under household management (in ropani)
Livestock (LIVESTO) + Number of livestock owned by a household




+ Number of days spent in various obligatory forestry
activities (proxy for leadership quality of household)
Technology of harvesting
(TCOST)
+ Tool cost (proxy for technology of harvesting)
Household size (HSIZE) + Number of people in household
Trees on private land
(PVTREE)
- Number of trees grown on private land
Forest quality (PFOREST) - Dummy for pine dominating crown cover (1= If
more than 75% crown cover dominated by pine
trees)
Forest quality (BFOREST) + Dummy for broadleaved forest (1=if more than 75




- If households belong to the poor income group = 1
Rich income group
(INCOMRICH)




- Dummy for a village nearest to the market (<1 km)
Market Distance (VILLAGE
DUMMY 2)
+ Dummy for a village farthest from the market (>5
km)
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Household members with bigger land ownership and livestock holding (or less poor households) are
expected to benefit proportionally more from CF because the management regime of CF is mainly
oriented to the production of intermediate products that serve as inputs in the farming system (Richards
et al., 1999). The difference in the extent of use of local forests may be associated with the number of
livestock units raised by the households. Wealthier households  with larger herds and more lands have
greater need for animal fodder and agriculture compost (Varughese, 1999), which, in turn, results in
inequitable use of the community resource base. In many rural settings, households invest surplus
income to increase the size and scale of production systems. Rural households may invest a substantial
amount of their income for either buying agricultural land or improved breeds of cattle. Since CFs
provide inputs for expanding agriculture activities, dependency on forest does not necessarily reduce
as household income increases. Under such circumstances, forest extractive activities continue to remain
as important for the household economy as off-farm income opportunity and agriculture itself (Hetch
et al., 1988). In this study, the extent of land and the number of units of livestock are assumed to be
positively related to the benefits from CFs.
Harvesting forest product is labour-intensive because people have to walk, search and  spend time
harvesting  such  products. Household size has a direct influence on the capacity of a household to
harvest forest products when there is very low level FUG restrictions on collecting products. A larger
household therefore has more labour to spread across various collecting and gathering activities and
such households may derive more resources from the commons. More labour in the family means the
household’s time constraints are set at a higher level as per the time allocation framework and that may
lead to extra extraction (Gunatilake, 1998). Therefore, the effect of household size on CPR income is
expected to be positive.
In many forest resource systems, users who live closer to the forest have a more secure and accessible
supply of produce regardless of whether or not there are allocation rules in place (Varughese, 1999). As
Gunatilake (1998) describes, families living close to the forest have the advantage of less time being
required to reach a particular forest resource and their links with forests are, therefore, expected to be
high. Those who live closer might be tempted to sneak into the forest at unauthorized times or harvest
unauthorized amounts of forest products even though management institutions are in place (Varughese,
1999). Therefore it is hypothesized that distance to the forest is negatively associated with forest
dependency.
Household position in decision-making level or time spent in leadership activities of community forestry
could also affect the extent of forest use and thus economic benefit from the commons. Awareness of
the potential gains achievable from CFs may be enhanced by regular meetings and discussions through
which relevant information is conveyed or even generated (Gaspert et al., 1999). This information may
not circulate well in a village to economically and politically weaker members due to the presence of
either physical or psychological barriers. Users with membership in executive committees are better
informed about the potential benefits of collective action.  As a result, they may have opportunities to
derive comparatively higher benefits from commons. Therefore, economic benefit from CPR is assumed
to be positively associated with an individual’s leadership status in decision-making levels. In this
study, transaction cost days spent in community forestry activities is used as a proxy for leadership
status.
In a subsistence system, the number of trees on the private land may also contribute to household needs
of forest products. Hence, households owning more private trees may rely less on community forests.
Therefore, the number of trees on private land is expected to have a negative impact on CPR income.
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Better technology may also enhance the efficiency of harvesting forest products. For example, Velded
(2000) posits that households employing better technology, knowledge and skills also benefit more
from the common grazing land in the Fulani village of Mali. Following this argument, this study also
assumes a positive relationship between better technology and CPR income.
In order to capture whether forest types influence household level income from CFs, two additional
dummy variables, i.e., pine forest and broad-leaved forests, were included in the model. Villagers
generally perceive coniferous forests to be less useful since they do not provide much fodder. There is
low ground flora diversity in pine forest and they are not suitable for ground grass collection. Moreover,
pine needles are a very inferior source of manure. In contrast, broad-leaved forest is much preferred
since it provides both fire wood, fodder and leaf litter. In case of forest type variable, mixed forests
with broad leaved and coniferous species (dominated species were Pinus roxburghii, Schima wallichii,
Castanopsis indica and other broad-leaved species) was considered a reference forest type. Household
income from CF is expected to be positively and negatively related to broad-leaved  and pine forests,
respectively.
Access to markets may reduce the dependency of households on the local commons since community
members may have some exit options in terms of outside earning opportunities. In contrast, villages far
from the market are more likely to be dependent on CPRs due to lack of alternate livelihood opportunity.
For the village nearer to market, the sign of coefficients for forest income is expected to be negative
while it is positive for the villages far from the market.
5. Results and discussion
In this section, the use of forest products and rules governing their use will be first discussed.  This is
followed by summary statistics for  the surveyed households.  Forest income and the distribution of
income is then presented.  Socio-economic heterogeneity and its implications for forest use are in the
last section
5.1 Forest use under forest user groups
Each FUG has its own institutional arrangement with regard to appropriation and provision rules,
detection and graduated sanctions, collective-choice arrangements, conflict-resolution mechanisms
and monitoring systems. The assembly, which is the highest authority of FUG, makes decisions with
regard to rules for governing forest use and management. The assembly prepares the constitution of the
FUG and forest operational plans, defines user rights, and determines rules for forest product collection
and distribution. In addition, it decides the use of community funds and implementation of various
community development activities. The executive committee of the FUG implements decisions on
behalf of the user’s assembly. All FUGs have written norms about penalties, fines and graduated sanctions
for those who violate the rules and regulations of CF. However, in some cases written documents or
minutes regarding rules cannot be identified since some rules are embedded in local culture and practice.
Since the operational rules of CF vary from one to another and it is difficult to document them all.  In
the following discussion, I present some of the general rules, based on field observation, that are common
to most FUGs considered in this study.
Most FUGs employ a forest watcher or use a rotational watching system in which every household is
responsible for providing an adult man to watch the forest on a specified day of the month. In some
cases, a household contributes in cash or kind to the FUG if they cannot provide an adult member for
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this purpose. There are strict rules that guide and shape individual behaviour in harvesting fuel-wood
and other products from CF. Conflicts related to illicit collection of forest products and cutting of trees
is resolved through cautioning the offender if it is a first-time offence. If the same offence is committed
a second time, the cutting and felling tools are confiscated. If the offender commits the same action a
third time,  the FUG takes stern actions such as cash fines and some sort of social exclusion.  User
households are not allowed to collect firewood throughout the year. In most of the study sites, Kacho
Daura (green cut wood) is distributed once or twice a year from February to April after the major
thinning and pruning operation. This is a feasible time to undertake various forestry operations (i.e.,
bush cutting, thinning, and pruning) and cutting of firewood, since it corresponds to reduced agricultural
activities. This period is also good for drying green firewood given that it is the hottest period of the
year. During this time, user households participate in various forms of forestry activities. Unwanted
trees and shrubs are cut, chopped into burnable sizes and distributed to local users in accordance with
the decisions of the Products Distribution Committee (office bearers of FUG committee). In some
FUGs, Sukay Daura (dead branches & fallen twigs) and Jhikra  (plant residue) are collected throughout
the year. Jhikra is used to support climbing vegetables and to make fences each year. Since Jhikra
comes mostly from bushes,  its use is not restricted. However, user households are not allowed to chop
standing trees (green and dry) and gather firewood from CF as and when they wish. Green firewood
harvesting is a collective activity and households are required to pay a small fee to the FUG for the
green firewood allocated to them by the FUG.
Ground grass or grass fodder (ghans) refers to all non-woody herbaceous plants cut for animal feeding.
It includes members of the grass and sedge families, a variety of legumes, and other broad leaf plants
(Fox, 1983). Tree fodder (Syaula) comes from a wide variety of trees found on community forests.
Syaula collection in CF occurs primarily at the end of the dry season, mainly from April to June.
During this period, crop residues from the preceding year have been exhausted and less grass fodder is
available on private land or in the CF due to very low rainfall and relatively dry weather. Though
everyone who is a legitimate user is allowed to collect tree and grass fodder from a CF, poorer households’
requirements for fodder and grass is always minimal or zero compared to those of the less poor.
Households that  do not use grass and tree fodder are not allowed to harvest these products for commercial
purposes.
Since most households are unable to buy chemical fertilisers to maintain soil fertility, collection of leaf
litter (Patkar) from CF for animal bedding and mulching is a common practice.  Households in the
study area use a combination of dry leaf litter, non-palatable green vegetative material, crop residues
and remains of uneaten fodder as animal bedding. The majority of bedding materials originate from
CF, shrublands and grasslands. It is harvested by lopping and is gathered as litter. Many user groups
allow a more or less unrestricted collection of dry Patkar (even while the use of firewood and NTFPs
are rigidly controlled). Although the actual harvested quantities of Patkar may be low in some FUGs,
they are important to the subsistence economy because they  remain as a major source of compost
fertiliser in order to maintain soil productivity. There are no limits on quantities and no fees to be paid
for this product. The time to collect fallen and rotten products and grass from CF is not strictly regulated.
Timber (Kath) is supplied to build houses as per the request of households who need to construct a new
house. The number of trees supplied for building a house varies from one to three depending upon the
size of the house and the tree. Generally, the building of new houses in the village is a known event in
the village and everyone co-operates in such work. There is a small fee that the household needs to pay
to get Kath from CF. Sale of timber, poles and firewood from CF is strictly prohibited. In most FUGs,
users are prohibited from cutting fruit trees and certain other special species.  Livestock grazing is also
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prohibited in CF, and they impose fines on those who transgress this rule. Access to CF with a major
harvesting tool is not permitted unless the individual is authorised to do so by the FUG executive
committee.
In summary, households directly use only fuel-wood and timber.  All other biomass goes as input to
complement other productive assets: paddy fields or livestock. This implies that a household’s use of
biomass is driven largely by agricultural land holding and cattle ownership. Villagers have varying
degrees of access to and control over biomass resources. Most user rights are non-transferable. Cash
income from CF is generally not distributed among the users.  Further, as previously mentioned,
users are not allowed to sell their private share of the produce in the market.  Thus, there is a strong
argument to be made that CF in Nepal is incentive-incompatible. Income from the sale of timber,
NTFPs and other products is directly deposited in community funds and used for community
development works. Among such development activities are construction of local school buildings
and irrigation channels, walking-path maintenance in the village and other related works. Capturing
the benefits generated from investments such as irrigation facilities is again a function of the socio-
economic and private natural resource endowments of households. Poorer households were
traditionally dependent on local forests for firewood and other NTFPs. However, with the
formalization of property rights, the access of poorer households to forests has been reduced due to a
restrictive management regime that discourages NTFP collection, charcoal making and other
activities in which occupational households (i.e., blacksmith, local liquor makers, etc.) were
involved in. During the field survey, some occupational households claimed that with the
formalization of property rights, their traditional rights had been gradually curtailed. This
curtailment was partially due to very restrictive and conservation-oriented management regimes and
partly through restrictions on the harvest of certain products to which they previously had access.
5.2 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics, presented in Table 2, provides evidence of socio-economic heterogeneity among
households. One-way ANOVA suggests that the three income groups significantly differ in terms of
land and livestock holdings and the number of trees on private land. Further, a large difference in
income from different forest products (fuel- wood, grass and fodder and leaf litter) by these income
groups is also evident. This provides a measure of inequality between income groups. In general, it can
be said that the sample households belonging to the three income groups are fairly heterogeneous in
terms of income and private asset holdings.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
CASTEL .00 1.00 .12 .33
CASTEH .00 1.00 .38 .49
EDU .00 10.20 3.84 2.38
AGE 22.00 84.00 43.73 12.88
GEND .00 1.00 .92 .27
LANDHO .00 85.00 12.87*** 11.24
LIVESTO .00 15.00 3.06*** 1.98
DIST .01 3.00 .72 .54
TRANSDAY 1.00 149.00 13.49 16.59
TCOST .00 385.00 79.66 60.45
HSIZE 1.00 16.00 6.37 2.58
PVTREE .00 1632.00 87.92*** 142.42
FULABOUR 20.00 288.00 109.00 70.83
GRAFOLABOUR .00 1620 517.80*** 485.89
LEAFLABOUR .00 3125.00 496.94*** 577.89
PFOREST .00 1.00 .19 .39
BFOREST .00 1.00 .09 .29
INCOMPOOR .00 1.00 .26 .44
INCOMRICH .00 1.00 .30 .46
VILLAGE DUMMY 1 .00 1.00 .10 .30
VILLAGE DUMMY 2 .00 1.00 0.15 0.36
Total Annual Average Forest





Income (in Nepalese rupees)
800.00 13500 2068.80** 1878.47
Annual Average Grass & Tree





Annual Average Leaf Litter
Income (in Nepalese rupees)
.00 51840 5752.53*** 8427.96
   *, ** and *** imply significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % probability levels (between income groups) respectively
+ 1 USD = 76.00 Nepalese Rupees
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5.3 Cash income of household by activity
Table 3 highlights the importance of various income sources, including tree and forest products (from
private land), to the economy of the sample households belonging to the eight different forest users
groups. Agriculture, livestock and off-farm agricultural activities are the most important activities that
contribute more than 60% of the total income of households followed by small business and cottage
industries and wage labour. Forest products from private land actually contribute less in terms of direct
cash generated by selling some timber and non-timber forest products. Of the eight forest user groups
considered, the first four groups have a relatively higher level of income from livestock and agricultural
activities. Markets for livestock products are well developed in these villages and the share of agriculture-
related income is higher for those households. The relatively high-income shares from other sources in
the first four villages reflects a high rate of employment since Kavre Palchowk district is near Kathmandu,
the capital city. Households in the Kavre Palchowk district produce rice, maize, wheat, potatoes and
different types of vegetables, which have a high market value in Kathmandu.
Table 3. Annual average cash income by activity  (Nepalese rupees)
Forest User
Groups























































































































a. Income deriving from selling forest products from private land (excluding subsistence use)
b. Includes business, small craft and cottage industries
c. Government/private services, remittance, and pension
*  Percent income from each activity to total income in parenthesis
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5.4 Contribution from community forests
Average gross value per household and per hectare of CF is illustrated in Table 4 along with an estimate
of average gross margin per person per day from CF. There appear to be four distinct FUGs based on
the gross value of products for each household. Shree Chhap and Karki Tar FUGs get considerably
higher gross values per household than the remaining user groups. This implies that the households are
more dependent on forests in these sites despite the low level of gross value per hectare of forest. A
very low return for labour in Shree Chhap and Karki Tar FUG is observed despite a very high level of
gross value per household.  This can be explained by the fact that subsistence forestry activities are
very attractive in these two sites where the opportunity cost of labour is relatively lower compared to
other sites. FUG members had very few alternatives in spite of the low per hectare value of their forest.
One way ANOVA suggests that the gross margin per person day is significantly different {F (7,298) =
5.06, p < 0.001} between the sites considered in this analysis. There is also noticeable variation in the
values per hectare of forest. This is due to the forest type, which may influence forest productivity.
Table 4. Gross values from CF (in Nepalese rupees*)
5.4.1. Gross and net income per household from CF
Table 5 presents the average gross and net income derived from community forests by households in
different income categories.  Table 5 shows that poorer households are getting lower gross value from
CF.  Income from CF increases gradually as one moves from the lowest to the highest income group.
This may be due to the fact that poorer households have less land and livestock ownership and so
cannot not use intermediate forest products like fodder, leaf litter and grasses.  These findings are
similar to that of Richards et al. (1999), which confirm that poorer households are currently benefiting
less from CF mainly because they have less livestock and farmland, which provide the main demand
for forest products as inputs.







Saradadevi 5589 3810 125
Jayala Chiti 5828 9668 111
Mahadevsthan 13917 5971 106
Thuli Ban 9875 10607 100
Gaurati 16398 5355 98
Shree Chhap 33177 6300 93
Janghare 17418 6602 97
Karki Tar 29857 4674 94
* F (7, 298) = 5.06, p= 0.000
Income Group N Gross Income Net Income
Poor 81 7,756 2,701
Middle 136 14,815 5,731
Rich 92 24,466 4,335
Sandee Working Paper No. 1-03 21
In order to see whether the gross margin values between the three income groups differ significantly,
an ANOVA was carried out to compare the true means between the three groups. The null hypothesis
for the one-way ANOVA was that all the underlying true means are identical (m1 = m2 = m3) against the
alternate hypothesis that there are differences between some of the true means (m1 @ m2 @ m3). It
appears that the gross value of household level income from CF is significantly different {F (2,306)=
24.165, p <0.001} between the three income groups.
The average net income per household from CF is presented on the last column of Table 5. Less poor
households are still better off than poorer households from CF.  It, however, appears that the net income
from CPR is an increasing function of wealth only up to a certain level, and then it declines.  Though
gross income is significantly different between income groups, comparison of net income suggests that
the three income groups are not statistically different {F (2,306)= 0.943 p = 0.391}.
5.4.2 Percentage contribution from CF to total household income
Table 6 presents the percentage of total household income from CF to total household income for the
three different income groups.  In contrast to claims made in the literature, this study shows that the
percentage of total household income from CF is lower for poorer households compared to middle
wealth and richer or less poor households. As Table 6 demonstrates,  gross income from CF as a
percentage of total income is lower for poorer households (14%) than those for middle-wealth (20%)
or richer households (22%).  However, if we look at net income, the percentage of net CF income
relative to total household income of poorer households is slightly higher (5%) than that of richer
households (4%).  The results also suggest a possible inverted U shaped relationship between net CPR
income and wealth.  Since this phenomenon should be analysed using time series data, what is shown
here is more suggestive than conclusive.
Table 6. Percentage of gross and net income from CPR to total household income
5.4.3. Share of livestock-related products
Community forests contribute to households by providing either fuel-wood or livestock-related products
such as tree fodder, cut grass and leaf litter. Table 7 shows the percentage of CF gross income from
livestock-related products for each stakeholder group. In most cases, livestock-related products
represented more than 60 percent of the gross value of production. The proportion of gross value from
livestock-related products increases with wealth as richer households derive higher income from tree
fodder, grass fodder, and leaf litter.
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Table 7. Percentage of CF gross income from livestock related products
5.5 Determinants of income from CF
This section analyses the determinants of household-level income from CF. Theory and empirical
evidence on the socio-economic factors influencing household-level income from community-based
forest management have drawn little attention in social science literature. Moreover, there is limited
prior knowledge on socio-economic determinants of forest dependency and the nature of their impacts
(Gunatilake, 1998). Hence the scatter plot method was used to scrutinize independent variables. The
covariance matrix of independent variables was examined to find whether there is multicollinearity
among the independent variables. Land holding was found to be highly correlated to both livestock
holdings and the number of tress in private lands. Though land holding was preferred to livestock
ownership in estimating equation 2, this variable drastically reduced the significance and magnitude of
income status variables (INCOMPOOR and INCOMRICH). So it was dropped in the regression analysis
for all empirical equations.  Examination of a scatter plot of residual against predicted values showed
limited possibility for heteroscedasticity in the data (Gujarati, 1995; Field, 2000). The diagnostic analysis
indicates that heteroskedasticity is not significant and the assumption of homoscedasticity has been
met.
The results for determinants of household income from CF are given in Table 8. The R-square and
adjusted R-square for the estimation is as high as 50% and 47% respectively. The F-statistics for
overall goodness of fit of the model is 16.09, which is highly significant at µ = 0.000. It is evident from
the analysis that most of the important variables are significant with the expected sign. In particular,
household level income from CF is significantly influenced by the number of livestock, the caste of the
household, education, gender, technology of harvesting, income status, quality of forests and distance
to nearest market and transaction cost days spent by households in various community forest-related
activities.
Differences in benefits from CF are thus correlated with differences in productive assets. For instance,
cattle ownership is positively and significantly related to household income from CF. More importantly,
forest income for those households belonging to the higher income group, i.e., “INCOMRICH,” is
positive and significant. Conversely, there is a negative and significant relationship between income
from CF and the variable “INCOMPOOR,” which is a dummy variable for the lower income group.
This indicates that resource usage from CF is directly proportional to private endowments since the
poorer segments of the community are not benefiting as much as the less poor.
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Table 8. Determinants of income from community forests
It appears that higher caste households benefit more from CF than lower caste households. This can be
explained by the observation that poor and lower caste households, especially the landless who do not
keep large livestock herds, do not benefit considerably from products such as tree and grass fodder and
leaf litter. Most FUGs have also introduced controls limiting extraction of forest products and introduced
payments for extraction rights to some of the products on which landless people were dependent.
Moreover, lower caste households have very little influence in the decision-making process so they
cannot influence forest management decisions in their favour.
Education is negatively and significantly related to forest income. Better-educated households may
have better earning opportunities outside the village commons and forest extraction activities may be
less attractive for those households. This finding is similar to that of Gunatilake (1998) who observes
that education of the family members is negatively related to forest income in the tropical biosphere
reserves in Sri Lanka. Higher educational levels may also be associated with greater opportunity costs
for labour (Yanggen and Reardon, 2001). Regarding gender, it is noteworthy that those households
headed by male members benefit more from CF than those with female heads. Women generally have
very low levels of involvement in the entire decision-making process of FUG. Women’s absence from
FUG decision-making means that they have little contribution to development of distributional rules.
Moreover, women may not travel as far as men to extract forest products due to the additional travel
time involved, and other household responsibilities. This observation is also similar to that of Amacher
et al. (1993), who observed that women are not the sole collectors of fuel wood from commons.
Variables Coefficients Std. error t-ratio p-value
CONSTANT 7.704 .821 9.384** .000
CASTEL -.392 .172 -2.281** .023
CASTEH .331 .112 2.949** .003
EDU -.541 .122 -4.434** .000
AGE -.185 .187 -.989 .324
GEND .756 .177 4.280** .000
LIVESTO .292 .088 3.302** .001
DIST 4.859E-02 .049 .991 .323
TRANSDAY .247 .052 4.716** .000
TCOST .277 .065 4.244** .000
HSIZE 1.213E-02 .135 .090 .928
PVTREE -5.697E-02 .045 -1.254 .211
PFOREST -.195 .135 -1.439 .151
BFOREST .515 .177 2.911** .004
INCOMPOOR -.382 .144 -2.656** .008
INCOMRICH .442 .121 3.644** .000
VILLAGE
DUMMY 1
-.436 .177 -2.461** .014
VILLAGE
DUMMY 2
.187 .159 1.171 .243
R2 = .50               Adjusted R2 = .47
** and * indicates 5% and 10% significant levels
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Technology of harvesting “TCOST” is positive and significantly related to household income indicating
that those households who are employing better technology derive higher income. In his empirical
study of Fulani village in Mali, Velded (2000) also observes that benefits from common grazing land
are exclusively related to capital, technology, and skills of individuals. With regard to the ‘transaction
costs day’ variable, households who spent more time on decision-making activities appear to obtain
more  forest product income. This maybe because households get correct information by engaging in
the decision-making process about when and where to collect.
While the dummy variable for broad-leaved forest is positive and significant, pine forest (Pinus
roxburghii) dummy is negatively associated with forest income. This indicates that forest types influence
the amount of harvest and income level by their effect on productivity of labour used in collection and
gathering. Pine trees suppress the ground flora vegetation and make the sites unfavourable for ground
grass collection.  Further, they are useless for fodder and pine needles are an inferior source of manure
(as well as being less effective in preserving the water supply) (Somanathan et al., 2002). The dummy
variable for village 1, which is less than 1 KM from the nearest market, is negatively and significantly
related to forest income. The availability of market near to the village may divert people from forest
dependent activities due to alternate earning opportunities. Further, the dummy for village 2 is positively
related to income from the forest. This indicates that people who are living far away from the market
depends more on the local commons to sustain their livelihoods. Gunatilake (1998) show similar result
in the Sinharaja forest of Sri Lanka.
In order to understand the relationships between income from each forest product and socio-economic
variables,  three more regression models i.e. regression for gross value of outputs from tree and grass
fodder, leaf litter and fuel wood (equation 3a, 3b, and 3c) were estimated. The results are presented in
Table 9. The overall significance of three models is reasonably good for this type of cross-sectional
data (R2 = .53, .36 and .26 respectively). As discussed earlier, most of the independent variables show
the expected signs and are statistically significant. Therefore, the following section discusses only the
results, which are different to those of the aggregated model presented earlier.
Villagers generally perceive coniferous forests to be less useful since they do not provide much fodder
and even there are very few ground flora diversity in pine forest and not suitable for ground grass
collection. Pine forest dummy is negatively and significantly associated with income from grass and
tree fodder. During the fieldwork, many villagers reported that plantation of pine trees in CF brought
various negative consequences such as reduction of ground vegetation, lack of fodder and ground
grasses, and extinction of some medicinal plants. It is interesting to note that broadleaved forest is
again positively and significantly related to forest income.
Village 1 dummy is negative and significant for tree and grass fodder and leaf litter regression. This
implies that households who are living near to the local market rely less on community forests. However,
this variable is positive and significant for fuel wood regression. This is just opposite what was observed
before. Village 2 dummy is positive for all regression with being significant for fodder and fuel wood
regression. It is apparent that households living far away from markets are more dependent in terms of
income from community forests. Overall, the results show a direct relationship between household
level income from CF and socio-economic variables such as ethnicity, gender, education, livestock
holdings, transaction days spent in CF activities, and technology of harvesting.
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Table 9.  Determinants of income from CF by forest product

















































































































R2 0.53 0.36 0.26
F-statistics 16.364 11.31 5.38
 *, ** and *** imply significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %  significance levels respectively, standard error in parenthesis
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6. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper seeks to understand the relationship between household socio-economic characteristics and
income from CFs in order to investigate whether granting property rights of forests in Nepal to local
communities has enhanced  the access of poorer households to the local commons. Towards this end,
this research compares income from CF that accrues to poor and non-poor households. The results
clearly show differences in gross income derived by households in different income classes. Poorer
households in forest dependent communities obtain much less value from community forests than
middle income and rich households. The average ‘poor’ household obtains NRS 7,756 from CF annually,
while the more ‘rich’ households obtain in average NRS 24,466 per year from the community forests.
Thus, in terms of absolute contribution to the total household income, community forests contribute
more to less poor households compared to the poor.
The greater absolute dependence of richer households relative to the poor appears to be a function of
the way FUGs have been institutionalized.  FUG devised rules appear to be biased toward meeting the
needs of wealthier households. For example, households that benefit more from CFs are members with
large land holdings and herds of livestock who have the capacity to use intermediate forest products
such as leaf litter, fodder and grass products. In our study we find that on average 85% of CPR related
income accruing to rich households is from collecting of livestock related forest products.  In contrast,
approximately 63% of CPR income accruing to poor households is related to livestock. Fodder and
grass are the products that become available right from the beginning when forests are enclosed for
regeneration purpose. These intermediate goods are allowed to be extracted without restrictions. These
intermediate goods are clearly not very important for landless and other poor households who do not
have productive assets that can use biomass based resources as inputs (see Richards et al., 1999 for
similar findings).
In terms of relative dependence, i.e., in terms of the percentage contribution of forests to household
income, the study results are quite contrary to the previous findings. If gross CPR income as a percentage
of household income is considered,  the results suggest that wealthier households are more dependent
on CPRs than poorer households. This finding is different from other studies such as Gunatilake et al.
(1993), Cavendish (1998, 1999), who find that in relative terms the poor are the most dependent on
forests resources.  Again, this relationship between CPR income and household income is likely to be
because of easier access to intermediate forest products, which benefits wealthier households.
Another interesting result from this study is the distributional significance of comparing net and gross
income from CF. A straightforward comparison of gross income shows that the richest class of households
gain the most from CF, the middle-income classes gain less than the rich and the poorest households
gain the least.  However, when net income from CF across these income categories is compared, then
an interesting inverted U shaped relationship emerges.  In terms of net income (taking all costs into
consideration), the poor, on average, obtain 5% of total household income from CPRs, middle-income
households obtain 8% of total income from forests, and, the most well off households obtain 4% of
their total income from forests. It seems that the relative dependence on forest resources declines as
income increases. This study, however, uses cross sectional data and categorical data on income.
Therefore, strong conclusion on this aspect is not warranted.
Overall, the study findings seem to suggest that because of the dependence on intermediate products,
household with assets gain more from CF than the poorest households in villages. However, once all
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costs associated with forest product collection and use are taken into account, the results are ambiguous
in terms of the contribution of CF resources to different stake-holder groups. Since this study could not
compare pre and post impact of CFs on household income, further comparative study on this issue may
help understanding the complexity involved in poverty, inequality and distributive consequences of
regulated forms of CPR regime.
The econometric analyses undertaken in this paper reinforces the notion that households with land and
livestock assets gain the most from CFs. Analysis of the determinants of household level income through
regression analysis indicates a strong relationship between private endowments of households and
dependency on CFs. In other words, heterogeneity does matter — household wealth, education, caste
and gender exert considerable influence on household collection of forest products. It is also clear that
male-headed households derive higher income from commonly managed forests than female-headed
households. This is in contrast with the traditional view that producing environmental goods from
forests is mainly a female activity.  This may be linked to the involvement of women in the FUGs as
office bearers. Analysis of the nature of representation in executive committee of FUG reveals that
only 15.7 per cent female were represented in FUG committee and the rest are all men usually from the
upper caste. Even if they are represented in the committee, women and members of disadvantaged
groups have less bargaining power at the community meetings and assemblies (Thapa et al., 1998).
The household survey revealed that about 40% of women are not aware of and familiar with forest
operational plans, or with rules and regulations, policy, goal and processes of CF. If women are not a
part of decision-making process they are likely to benefit less.
On the other hand, education and caste are negatively related to forest income. More educated households
may have better earning opportunity outside the commons so that forestry activities seems to be less
attractive for those households owing to high opportunity costs of their time. Thus, availability of
Government and private sector jobs and self-employment opportunities may well divert people from
forest dependent extractive activities. The forest type also determines household income, as broadleaved
forests are more productive than pine forests. Since plantation of pine trees do not serve requirements
of villagers, tree planting on commons should be understood in light of local systems of livelihood and
importance of tree species in meeting diverse needs of villagers. Thus, FUGs should devise output
sharing rules that address the special needs of the marginalised and occupational households in the
community who have relatively a high level of dependence on CPRs. Access to markets seems to
provide people with alternative livelihood opportunities and thus reduce dependence of households on
CPRs.
This study raises the issue of whether conservation-oriented measures that promote regulated systems
of forest management in Nepal under-mine social goals such as equitable distribution of benefits.  It is
reasonable to require that policies aimed at allocating natural resources should not eschew equity
considerations altogether (Tsur and Dinar, 1995).  Some scholars such as Majone (1993) argue that
policy changes in CF management should not be precipitated by ideas about conservation and efficiency,
rather, they need to be fully cognizant of redistributive concerns. CF interventions, to some extent, are
unable to recognize that resources often have multiple users, who are characterized by different use
patterns and divergent interests. Thus, there is a risk that CF will focus on long-term accumulation of
timber and ecological service values in order to meet the need of rural elites, whereas this might reduce
opportunities available for the poor.
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One feasible option would be to include leasehold and private property rights provisions within CF
management regimes. There may be possibilities for an equitable and efficient system of transferability
of property rights. The existing system of CF management does not allow a user group member to sell
her/his use rights or rights to a particular forest product to outsiders or other members within the same
community. If property rights cannot be transferred, households poorly endowed with lands and livestock
benefit less from commons.  Voluntary exchange of rights within overall restrictions on resource-use
may increase benefits to poorer households. (Posoner, 1977 as quoted in Bromley, 1989 and Baland
and Platteau, 1996). Thus, private property options within a common property arrangement may be one
way to move toward more equitable distribution of benefits among heterogeneous social groups.
This study suggests that household and community characteristics and respective management regimes
need to be carefully considered when handing over the forests from government ownership to community
management. Since poor people do not get substantial benefits from agricultural related forest products,
forest management policy needs to be directed at increasing alternative forest products, mainly NTFPs
that played a significant role in supplying livelihood needs in the past. In order to ensure that the
interests of poorer households are fairly represented in an operational regime, it may be necessary to
require that the number of poorer and occupational households as well as women on the FUG committee
should at least be proportional to their numbers in the community. Equally important is supporting and
empowering FUGs in various aspects of CF management that especially focus on poorer forest-dependent
households so that their interests are adequately represented in forest planning and management decisions.
Finally one of the limitations of this study is that it could not compare pre- and post impact of community
forests on household income.  It was difficult to get historical data (especially on labour time allocated
to gathering and collection) when forests were under the government control.  Time series information
would contribute to a richer analyses of distributional issues.
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APPENDIX A
Questionnaire for the Household Survey
Researcher: Bhim Adhikari Interviewer:
Date of Interview: Village/Ward
Household Head Name: Age………… Caste…….
A. Demographic Information
Q. 1a. Please read out and fill the following household information


















Agriculture = 1 Business = 2 Public Service = 3 Private Service = 4
Cottage Industry = 5 Agriculture + Business = 6 Agriculture + Service = 7
Wage Labour = 8 Other = 10 (Please Specify…)
Q. 2a. Has any members of your family has been out of home for more than three months?
(  ) Yes: Go to Q. 3a ( ) No: Go to Q. 1b
Q. 3a Where and on what occupation they are working?
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B. Land Holding, Tenure and Production Systems
Q 1b. Please read out and fill the following landholding and tenure information
Land Characteristics Land Type and Area (Ropani)





S. No. Asset Access








Q. 2b Which of the following assets does your household own?
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Q. 3b Which of the following livestock does your household own (now and before implementing the
community forestry program)?
S. No. Livestock species Number of livestock









Q. 4b What are the benefits of livestock?
S.No Benefits Please tick
1 Draught power




6 Others (please specify)
Q. 5b. Please mention the annual income from sale of following livestock products?
Product Unit Total
Production
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Q 6b. What was the income from the sale of live animals last year?







Q. 7b How long the field crop production can meet your household food demand?
(   ) < 3 months (  ) 3 to 6 months  (  ) 6 to 9 months  (  ) 9 to 12 months  (  ) > than 12 months
Q. 8b What are the number of fodder/fuel wood trees in your private land now and before imple-
menting the community forestry program?









C. Off-farm Production System
Q 1c. Besides crop and livestock income, what are other sources of household income?
No. HH member involved Annual Income (Rs.) Sources 
Men Women Men Women 
Business     
Service     
Cottage industry     
Wage labour     
Remittance     
Pension     
Others     
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Q. 2c Does your family members involved in marketing of following products from private forest?




Products Unit Sale 
Quantity/year 
Men Women Men Women 
Fodder       
Fuel wood       
Herbs/medicine       
Fruits/Nuts       
Thatch grass       
Other products        
 
D. Natural Resource Management and Utilization
Q. 1d What is your annual consumption of following forest products now and before the implemen-
tation of community forestry?
Annual Consumption S. No Products Unit 
Before CF Now 
1 Fuel wood    
2 Tree fodder    
3 Timber    
4 Leaf litter    
5 Grasses     
6 Thatching grass     
7 Fruits/Nuts     
8 Herbal medicine    
9 Others    
 
Q. 2d What are the quantities of forest products available for your household annually from commu-
nity forest and what amount from your own private forest?
Now* Private Forest Product Unit Before CF 
CF1 CF2 CF3  
Firewood       
Tree fodder       
Timber       
Leaf litter       
Thatching grass       
Fruits/nuts       
Herbal medicine       
Grasses       
Others       
 
* CF1 = Community forestry 1, CF2 = Community forestry 2, CF3 = Community forestry 3 (In case, household deserve the membership
of more than one forest user group)
Sandee Working Paper No. 1-03 39
Q. 3d Where and how many times do you take your livestock for grazing?
Season and Frequency Grazing 
Time 
Grazing Area Livestock 
Head 
Summer Winter Monsoon Spring  
Community 
Forest 
      
National Forest       
Grazing Area       
Private land       
Fallow Land       
Others       
 
Q. 4d  How forest products are distributed?
(   ) Family size/equity (  ) Equality
Q. 5d. Are you satisfied with existing distribution process?
(  ) Yes (  ) No
E. Resource Harvesting/Utilization Costs
Q. 1e How much time do you spend in collecting a unit of following forest product?
Collection Time Remarks S.N. Forest Products Unit 
Men Women Children  
1 Firewood      
2 Tree fodder      
3 Timber      
4 Leaf litter      
5 Thatching grass      
6 Ground grasses      
7 Herbal medicine      
8 Fruits/nuts      
9 Others      
 
Q. 2e. How much time do you have to spend in travelling to and from your house in collecting
following forest product?
Responsible Person S.N. Forest products Unit Tim
e Men Women Children 
 Firewood      
 Tree fodder      
 Timber      
 Leaf litter      
 Thatching grass      
 Fruits      
 Herbal medicine      
 Grasses      
 Others      
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Q. 3e How much do you have to pay (fees) for harvesting a unit of following commodities from the
community forestry?
S.N. Forest Products Unit Unit Price (Rs.) Remarks 
1 Firewood    
2 Tree fodder    
3 Timber    
4 Leaf litter    
5 Thatching grass    
6 Fruits    
7 Herbal medicine    
8 Grasses    
9 Others    
 
Q. 4e How much time you need to spend annually in following FUG obligatory activities?
S. N. FUG Activities Time Spent 
(Days) 
Remarks 
1 CF Protection (watching, monitoring etc.)   
2 Plantation   
3 Weeding   
4. Thinning and pruning   
5. Meetings   
6.  Communication   
7. Travelling   
 
5e. Is there any direct cash incur to your household annually for communicating, information gather-
ing and travelling for community forestry related activities? If yes, what is the tentative direct cash
expenses (Rs.                  )
6e. What amount (User Group membership fee) you have to pay annually as a member of Forest
User Group?
( Rs.          ) Pay (    ) Do not need to pay
7e. Do you hire any paid labour beside your family members in collecting or processing of those
forest products from community forest? (       ) Number
8e. What is the hired labour rate per day? (           )
9e. What is the distance between your home and community forest? (              ) km
10e. How long do you have to travel to and from the community forest for animal grazing?
(        ) Minutes (        ) Hours
Q. 11e Who in your family grazed? (  ) Men (  ) Women (  ) Children
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% Use S.No. Type of Tools Cost (Rs.) Economic 
Life (Years) Forestry Non-Forestry 
1 Axe     
2 Sickle     
3 Doko     
4 Namlo     
5 Rope     
6 Saw     
7 Khurpa     
8 Others     
 
F. Household Awareness/Participation/Policy issues in CPR Management
Q. 1f. When was the forest user group and executive committee formed? (BS 20………..)
Q. 2f. When was the community forestry handed over to the community (BS………)
Q. 3f. Do you participate in users annual/monthly assembly?
(  ) Yes (  ) No
Q. 4f Are any women members from your household represented in users committee?
(    ) yes (     ) No
Q. 5f How do you evaluate the performance of users committee?
(  ) Highly satisfactory (  ) Satisfactory (  ) Neutral (  ) Not satisfied
Q. 6f. At what stage do you and your family members participate in organization activities?
(  ) Planning and decision-making  (  ) Implementation (  ) benefit sharing  (  ) Evaluation
Q. 7f. How do you evaluate the rate of your and family members participation in FUG activities?
(  ) Strong participation(  ) Occasional participation (  ) Not very often (  ) Hardly ever
Q. 8f. How do you know when to collect various forest products?
(  ) Attending committee meeting (  ) Informed by committee members
(  ) Informed by neighbours (  ) FUG assembly
Q. 9f. What are the advantages and disadvantages of membership of the Forest Users Group?




Advantages of Membership Disadvantages of Membership 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
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Q. 10f. What is your perception regarding equity issue in community forestry?
 Equity Issues Y/N How? 
Are you relatively satisfied with existing institutional 
arrangements? 
  
Have you even been disadvantaged by institutional 
arrangements? 
  
Is allocation of membership rights in organization fair?   
Has distribution of resources and wealth change?   
Are costs and benefits of resource management based on 
individual’s ability to pay? 
  
Others (please specify)   
 
G. Natural Resource Quality and Management
Q. 1g According to your idea, what is changing trend of the following indicators in the last 10 years?
Q. 2g. In your opinion, what were the likely effects of institutional change i.e. from state manage-
ment to community-based management in local livelihoods?
Impacts Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Increase equal access to resource 
base 
    
Threat alternative livelihood     
Unnecessary restriction     
Excessive collection charge     
Help reduce poverty     
Able to meet the household demand     
Decrease access to CF     
 
Trend Indicators 
Increasing Constant Decreasing 
Remarks 
Crop production     
Area under forest     
Area under pasture     
Tree species     
Number of water spring     
Time to collect fuel, fodder and leaf litter      
Tree on private land     
Flooding/landslides     
CF related employment opportunity     
Time to fetch water     
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H. Miscellaneous
Q. 1h Are you or your family members are associated/participated in any village level development
organization? (     )  Yes (       ) No
Q. 2h If yes, please provide following information?
Number 
involved 
S. No Name of 
Organization  






1        
2        
3        
4        
 
 * Local informal = 1 Local formal = 2 Government= 3 NGO=4  INGO=5
** Saving and credit=1 Conservation=2 Agriculture/livestock production=3
Women’s organization=4, Village cooperative=5 Others=6 (specify)
Q. 3h Do you need credit for your livelihood activities?  (  ) Yes (  ) No
Q. 4h If yes, where do you go for credit?
(  ) Bank (  ) Land lord (  ) Neighbour (  ) Relatives (  ) Co-operatives
(  ) others (please specify)
Q 5h How does FUG investing the surplus fund for various community development activities?
Are you benefited from 
this investment 
S. No Investment 
Yes No 
If no, give the reason 
1 Drinking water    
2 Rural road    
3 Irrigation scheme    
4 Temple    
5 School    
6 Health post    
7 Community House    
8 Others    
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Q 7h. Do you have any suggestions regarding the improvement of existing situation especially
equity aspects of community forestry? How community forestry will be more profitable and
sustainable?
Q. 6h. What is the trend in employment opportunities in the past 10 years in your area?
S.No Nature of Employment Increasing Decreasing 
1 Forest-based opportunities   
2 Agriculture-based opportunities   
3 Cottage industry based 
opportunities 
  
4 Government   
5 Non-government   
6 Private sector   
7 Others    
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APPENDIX B
Questionnaire for FUG Executive Committee Members
Name of Community Forest: Number of User household:
Date of FUG Formation: Date of Handover:
Area:
1. What are the income generating (IG) activities in community forest?
S.N. IG Activities Area Beneficiary Households 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
2. What are the income sources for Forest User Group?
S.N. Income Source Remarks 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
3. What commodities are being extracted for commercial purpose so far?
S.N. Commodity Unit Quantity Total income (Rs.) 
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Q 3i How does FUG investing the surplus fund for various community development activities?
S. 
No 
Investment No. of Beneficiary 
Households 
Remarks 
1 Drinking water   
2 Irrigation scheme    
3 School   
4 Temple   
5 Health post   
6 Rural Access Road (Foot Path)   
7 Community House   
8 Others   
 
4. When FUG members gather for meeting?
(     ) Once a month (      )  Once a two months     (    ) As and when required
5. When the meeting of executive committee held?
(   ) Once a month (    ) Twice a month (    ) As and when required
6. What is the percentage of user household who attend last 4 meetings?
7. What is the parentage of user committee members who attended last 4 meetings?
8. How do you evaluate the institutional performance of Forest User Group? (1= Least satisfactory
and 5= Highly satisfactory)
Rating S.N.  Name of Committee members 
1 2 3 4 5 
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9. Does income generating and other activities undertaken by your group has been emulated in
neighbouring areas?
(     ) Yes (      ) No
10. What is the composition of Forest User Group Executive Committee in terms of gender?
(     )  Number of female (      ) Number of male
11. How user groups were formed?
(    ) Initiative from Forest Department (      ) Community’s own initiative
12. How decision of executive committee is made?
(        ) Consensus (      ) Majority
13. What is your suggestion regarding institutional development and distribution system of
community forestry program?

